Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace

@article{Nye2017DeterrenceAD,
  title={Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace},
  author={Joseph S. Nye},
  journal={International Security},
  year={2017},
  volume={41},
  pages={44-71}
}
  • J. Nye
  • Published 1 February 2017
  • Computer Science
  • International Security
Understanding deterrence and dissuasion in cyberspace is often difficult because our minds are captured by Cold War images of massive retaliation to a nuclear attack by nuclear means. The analogy to nuclear deterrence is misleading, however, because many aspects of cyber behavior are more like other behaviors, such as crime, that states try (imperfectly) to deter. Preventing harm in cyberspace involves four complex mechanisms: threats of punishment, denial, entanglement, and norms. Even when… 
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