Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why do Countries Change Their Form of Government?

  title={Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why do Countries Change Their Form of Government?},
  author={Bernd Hayo and Stefan Voigt},
  journal={Institutions \& Transition Economics: Political Economy eJournal},
  • B. Hayo, S. Voigt
  • Published 2 March 2010
  • Economics, Political Science
  • Institutions & Transition Economics: Political Economy eJournal
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