Determinants of Board Size and Composition: A Theory of Corporate Boards

@article{Raheja2005DeterminantsOB,
  title={Determinants of Board Size and Composition: A Theory of Corporate Boards},
  author={Charu G. Raheja},
  journal={Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis},
  year={2005},
  volume={40},
  pages={283-306}
}
  • Charu G. Raheja
  • Published 2005
  • Business
  • Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
  • This paper models the interaction of firm insiders and outsiders on a corporate board and addresses the question of the board's ideal size and composition. In the model, the board is responsible for monitoring projects and making CEO succession decisions. Inside directors are better informed regarding the quality of firm investment projects, but outsiders can use CEO succession to motivate insiders to reveal their superior information and help the board implement higher value projects. The… CONTINUE READING
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