Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions

  title={Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions},
  author={R. Porter and J. D. Zona},
  journal={Journal of Political Economy},
  pages={518 - 538}
This paper examines bidding in auctions for state highway construction contracts, in order to determine whether bid rigging occurred. Detection of collusion is possible because of limited participation in the collusive scheme. Collusion did not take the form of a bid rotation scheme. Instead, several ring members bid on most jobs. One was a serious bidder, and the others submitted phony higher bids. The bids of noncartel firms, as well as their rank distribution, were related to cost measures… Expand
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Proof of Damages
  • (July-December
  • 1989
Bid-rigging and the Competitive Bidding Process: Theory and Evidence.
  • Ph.D. dissertation, State Univ. New York Stony Brook,
  • 1986
Asymmetric Information and Collusive Behavior in Auction Markets." A.E.R
  • 1985