• DOI:10.55540/0031-1723.2937
• Corpus ID: 27047785

Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?

@article{Macdougall2017DestinedFW,
  title={Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?},
  author={James Macdougall},
  journal={The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters},
  year={2017}
}

• James Macdougall
• Published 1 June 2017
• Political Science
• The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters

Professor Graham Allison gazes into the future of US-China relations in Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? only to find the best guide to the future is the past. Specifically based on Thucydides's well-known observation that "It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable," Allison has popularized the phrase "Thucydides's Trap" to describe the dangerous historical dynamic that develops when a rising power threatens to displace an established ruling power. (1) This dynamic was summarized aptly in an earlier article: "The rise of a new power has been attended by uncertainty and anxieties. Often, though not always, violent conflict has followed. The rise in the economic and military power of China, the world's most populous country, will be a central question for Asia and for American foreign policy at the beginning of a new century. " (2) In researching cases of rising powers challenging ruling powers over the last 500 years, Allison and the Thucydides Trap Project at Harvard University found 12 of 16 cases resulted in war. Avoiding Thucydides's Trap thus equates to avoiding war. Based on this analysis, Allison concludes that "as far ahead as the eye can see, the defining question about global order is whether China and the United States can escape Thucydides's Trap." (3) The high percentage of cases that resulted in war provide persuasive support to the overall argument that war between the United States and China may be more likely than generally considered. Yet a few cautionary notes on the data set and methodology are warranted. First, while the principal result of the study (12 of 16 cases led to war) seems objective, decisions on what cases to include necessarily involve some subjective analysis. As such, the overall data supporting the general argument have evolved since the initial Thucydides's Trap argument was presented. In 2012-14 the argument cited 11 of 15 cases leading to war. In 2015 and subsequently, the data set was revised to include 12 of 16 cases that resulted in war. (5) Later in 2015, a detailed argument presenting the Thucydides's Trap metaphor appeared in the Atlantic. The 16 cases were identified in a table accompanying the article and included information on time period, ruling power, rising power, and result. (6) In Destined for War the data also include 12 of 16 cases leading to war, but a comparison between the table in the book (42) and the table from the 2015 Atlantic article shows one case from the 2015 data was dropped and another was added. In the event, they both resulted in "no war" so the overall numbers remain the same; but, such changes highlight the difficulties inherent to determining which cases to include. While 12 of 16 may have a scientific ring, the result may be less rigorous than it appears; certainly, it is subject to further analysis. (7) Notwithstanding such questions about the aggregate data, the book's use of the Thucydides's Trap metaphor to alert the potential, indeed the seeming likelihood, that the current global shift in power could lead to war is its principal strength. The book's conclusion, based on the available evidence, "when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, the resulting structural stress makes a violent clash the rule, not the exception," is a powerful warning that should help focus the attention of both policymakers and scholars to the perils inherent in the uneven growth of power. (8) Although a valuable lens through which to see the current shifting relationship between the United States and China, the text is somewhat less useful in prescribing policy or strategy responses that might be taken in pursuit of US objectives given the international context described. As an aid to statecraft, Allison says, "History shows that major ruling powers can manage relations with rivals, even those that threaten to overtake them, without triggering war. …