Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism

  title={Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism},
  author={Chris Heathwood},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
Hedonism and the desire-satisfaction theory of welfare (“desire satisfactionism”) are typically seen as archrivals in the contest over identifying what makes one’s life go best. It is surprising, then, that the most plausible form of hedonism just is the most plausible form of desire satisfactionism. How can a single theory of welfare be a version of both hedonism and desire satisfactionism? The answer lies in what pleasure is: pleasure is, in my view, the subjective satisfaction of desire… Expand
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