Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare

  title={Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare},
  author={Chris Heathwood},
One of the most important disputes in the foundations of ethics concerns the source of practical reasons. On the desire-based or internalist view, only one’s desires (broadly construed) provide one with reasons to act. On the value-based view, the strongest form of externalism about reasons, reasons are instead provided by the objective evaluative facts, and never by our desires. Lying in between, the hybrid or weak externalist view recognizes both sources. Similarly, there are desire-based and… Expand
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