Designing the US Incentive Auction

@inproceedings{Milgrom2017DesigningTU,
  title={Designing the US Incentive Auction},
  author={Paul R. Milgrom and Ilya Segal},
  year={2017}
}
* Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. (milgrom@stanford.edu & isegal@stanford.edu). This paper, which was initially written in 2013, has been changed to bring citations up to date, to mention treaty developments involving Mexico and Canada, and to acknowledge that the proposed auction rules were eventually adopted and used. We thank our Auctionomics co-consultants Jonathan Levin and Kevin Leyton-Brown, who participated in creating the design described here. Any… 
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