Designing a biocontainment unit to care for patients with serious communicable diseases: a consensus statement.

@article{Smith2006DesigningAB,
  title={Designing a biocontainment unit to care for patients with serious communicable diseases: a consensus statement.},
  author={Philip Smith and Arthur O. Anderson and George W. Christopher and Theodore J Cieslak and G J Devreede and Glen A Fosdick and Carl B. Greiner and John M Hauser and Steven H. Hinrichs and Kermit D. Huebner and Peter Iwen and Dawn R Jourdan and Mark G Kortepeter and V Paul Landon and Patricia A. Lenaghan and Robert E Leopold and Leroy A Marklund and James W. Martin and Sharon Medcalf and Robert J Mussack and Randall H Neal and Bruce S. Ribner and Jonathan Y. Richmond and Chuck Rogge and Leo A. Daly and Gary A Roselle and Mark E. Rupp and Anthony R. Sambol and Joann Schaefer and Jonathan Sibley and Andrew J. Streifel and Susanna G. Von Essen and Kelly Lyn Warfield},
  journal={Biosecurity and bioterrorism : biodefense strategy, practice, and science},
  year={2006},
  volume={4 4},
  pages={
          351-65
        }
}
In spite of great advances in medicine, serious communicable diseases are a significant threat. Hospitals must be prepared to deal with patients who are infected with pathogens introduced by a bioterrorist act (e.g., smallpox), by a global emerging infectious disease (e.g., avian influenza, viral hemorrhagic fevers), or by a laboratory accident. One approach to hazardous infectious diseases in the hospital setting is a biocontainment patient care unit (BPCU). This article represents the… Expand
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