Designing Checks and Balances

  title={Designing Checks and Balances},
  author={Tiberiu Dragu and Xiaochen Fan and James H. Kuklinski},
  journal={Institutions \& Transition Economics: Political Economy eJournal},
Essential to the Madisonian conception of checks and balances is the division of policy-making authority among multiple actors such that each can veto proposed changes in policy. We use a mechanism design approach to analyze checks and balances institutions. We show that checks and balances institutions in which the most preferred policy of the more moderate player is the unique equilibrium outcome are the only checks and balances institutions that are strategy-proof, efficient, and responsive… Expand
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