Design Tradeoffs in Concave Cost-Sharing Games

  title={Design Tradeoffs in Concave Cost-Sharing Games},
  author={Matthew Phillips and Jason R. Marden},
  journal={IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control},
This note focuses on the design of cost-sharing rules to optimize the efficiency of the resulting equilibria in cost-sharing games with concave cost functions. Our analysis focuses on two well-studied measures of efficiency, termed the price of anarchy and price of stability, which provide worst-case guarantees on the performance of the (worst or best) equilibria. Our first result characterizes the cost-sharing design that optimizes the price of anarchy, followed by the price of stability. This… Expand
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  • The 43rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2002. Proceedings.
  • 2002
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