Description and the Problem of Priors

  title={Description and the Problem of Priors},
  author={Jeffrey A. Barrett},
  • J. Barrett
  • Published 11 February 2014
  • Philosophy
  • Erkenntnis
Belief-revision models of knowledge describe how to update one’s degrees of belief associated with hypotheses as one considers new evidence, but they typically do not say how probabilities become associated with meaningful hypotheses in the first place. Here we consider a variety of Skyrms–Lewis signaling game (Lewis in Convention. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1969; Skyrms in Signals evolution, learning, & information. Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) where simple descriptive… 
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Signaling games provide basic insights into some fundamental questions concerning the explanation of meaning. They can be analyzed in terms of rational choice theory and in terms of evolutionary game
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Skyrms–Lewis signaling games illustrate how meaningful language may evolve from initially meaningless random signals (Lewis, Convention1969; Skyrms 2008). Here we will consider how incommensurable
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  • R. Herrnstein
  • Psychology
    Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior
  • 1970
Experiments on single, multiple, and concurrent schedules of reinforcement find various correlations between the rate of responding and the rate or magnitude of reinforcement, which can be accounted for by a coherent system of equations.