Deriving Ethics from Action: A Nietzschean Version of Constitutivism

@article{Katsafanas2011DerivingEF,
  title={Deriving Ethics from Action: A Nietzschean Version of Constitutivism},
  author={P. Katsafanas},
  journal={Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
  year={2011},
  volume={83},
  pages={620-660}
}
  • P. Katsafanas
  • Published 2011
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
How can we justify normative claims about what there is reason to do, such as ‘‘there is reason not to lie,’’ or ‘‘you should not murder’’? Lately, a number of philosophers have argued that we can justify normative claims by deriving them from facts about the nature of action. According to constitutivism, action has a certain structural feature – a constitutive aim – that both constitutes events as actions and generates a standard of assessment for action. We can use this standard of assessment… Expand
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