Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations

  title={Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations},
  author={Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  pages={117 - 146}
Elections affect both the probability of successful ratification and the terms of international trade agreements; domestic politics in its simplest form shapes international negotiations. Without elections, the extent of protection in a trade agreement increases with the degree of divided government, and the Schelling conjecture—whereby an international negotiator can point to a hawkish legislature to extract greater concessions from the foreign country—holds only when the legislature is not… Expand
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