Deflationism, Arithmetic, and the Argument from Conservativeness

@article{Waxman2017DeflationismAA,
  title={Deflationism, Arithmetic, and the Argument from Conservativeness},
  author={Daniel Waxman},
  journal={Mind},
  year={2017},
  volume={126},
  pages={429-463}
}
Many philosophers believe that a deflationist theory of truth must conservatively extend any base theory to which it is added (roughly: talking about truth shouldn’t allow us to establish any new claims about subject-matters not involving truth). But when applied to arithmetic, it’s argued, the imposition of a conservativeness requirement leads to a serious objection to deflationism: for the Gödel sentence for Peano Arithmetic (PA) is not a theorem of PA, but becomes one when PA is extended by… Expand
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Deflationism and the function of truth

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