Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains

@inproceedings{Dworczak2016DeferredAW,
  title={Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains},
  author={Piotr Dworczak},
  booktitle={EC},
  year={2016}
}
Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithms play a central role in matching theory. In a seminal paper, Gale and Shapley [1962] used a men-proposing DA algorithm to show existence of a stable matching in the marriage problem. Stability has proven to be the key to designing successful matching markets in practice and is one reason why DA algorithms have gained so much prominence in market design. The Gale-Shapley algorithm produces the stable matching that is most preferred by agents on the proposing… CONTINUE READING
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