Defense Strategies for Asymmetric Networked Systems with Discrete Components

@article{Rao2018DefenseSF,
  title={Defense Strategies for Asymmetric Networked Systems with Discrete Components},
  author={Nageswara S. V. Rao and Chris Y. T. Ma and Kjell Hausken and Fei He and David K. Y. Yau and Jun Zhuang},
  journal={Sensors (Basel, Switzerland)},
  year={2018},
  volume={18}
}
We consider infrastructures consisting of a network of systems, each composed of discrete components. The network provides the vital connectivity between the systems and hence plays a critical, asymmetric role in the infrastructure operations. The individual components of the systems can be attacked by cyber and physical means and can be appropriately reinforced to withstand these attacks. We formulate the problem of ensuring the infrastructure performance as a game between an attacker and a… 

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