Defending the piggyback principle against Shapiro and Sober’s empirical approach

@article{Baltimore2009DefendingTP,
  title={Defending the piggyback principle against Shapiro and Sober’s empirical approach},
  author={Joseph A. Baltimore},
  journal={Synthese},
  year={2009},
  volume={175},
  pages={151-168}
}
Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience/exclusion argument attempts to show that non-reductive physicalism is incompatible with mental causation. This influential argument can be seen as relying on the following principle, which I call “the piggyback principle”: If, with respect to an effect, E, an instance of a supervenient property, A, has no causal powers over and above, or in addition to, those had by its supervenience base, B, then the instance of A does not cause E (unless A is identical with B). In… Expand
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