Defending the piggyback principle against Shapiro and Sober’s empirical approach

  title={Defending the piggyback principle against Shapiro and Sober’s empirical approach},
  author={Joseph A. Baltimore},
Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience/exclusion argument attempts to show that non-reductive physicalism is incompatible with mental causation. This influential argument can be seen as relying on the following principle, which I call “the piggyback principle”: If, with respect to an effect, E, an instance of a supervenient property, A, has no causal powers over and above, or in addition to, those had by its supervenience base, B, then the instance of A does not cause E (unless A is identical with B). In… 
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A Complete Bibliography of Publications in Synthese, 2020–2029
Abduction [336]. Abductive [11, 124]. ability [143]. Absence [188]. absences [233]. absurdity [154]. Acceptable [18]. accepting [120]. account [81, 169, 129, 13, 196, 168]. across [35]. Action [271,


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