Defender (Mis)coordination in Security Games

@inproceedings{Jiang2013DefenderI,
  title={Defender (Mis)coordination in Security Games},
  author={Albert Xin Jiang and Ariel D. Procaccia and Yundi Qian and Nisarg Shah and Milind Tambe},
  booktitle={IJCAI},
  year={2013}
}
We study security games with multiple defenders. To achieve maximum security, defenders must perfectly synchronize their randomized allocations of resources. However, in real-life scenarios (such as protection of the port of Boston) this is not the case. Our goal is to quantify the loss incurred by miscoordination between defenders, both theoretically and empirically. We introduce two notions that capture this loss under different assumptions: the price of miscoordination, and the price of… CONTINUE READING
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