Deepest voting: A new way of electing

  title={Deepest voting: A new way of electing},
  author={Jean-Baptiste Aubin and Ir{\`e}ne Gannaz and Samuela Leoni and Antoine Rolland},
  journal={Mathematical Social Sciences},
Classical approval voting processes suffer from well-known impossibility theorems. We consider grading-based voting, where voters give a grade rather than a preference to each candidate. Numerous voting processes have been proposed in this framework, such as majority judgment or range voting, showing interesting properties. This article aims to present a unified framework for grading-based voting processes. Our statement is that a voting process can be seen as the finding of the innermost point… 

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