Deduction Dilemmas: The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism

@article{Dur2018DeductionDT,
  title={Deduction Dilemmas: The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism},
  author={Umut Dur and P. Pathak and Fei Song and T. S{\"o}nmez},
  journal={Political Economy: Government Expenditures & Related Policies eJournal},
  year={2018}
}
  • Umut Dur, P. Pathak, +1 author T. Sönmez
  • Published 2018
  • Business
  • Political Economy: Government Expenditures & Related Policies eJournal
  • This paper analyzes the properties of the Taiwan mechanism, used for high school placement nationwide starting in 2014. In the Taiwan mechanism, points are deducted from an applicant's score with larger penalties for lower ranked choices. Deduction makes the mechanism a new hybrid between the well-known Boston and deferred acceptance mechanisms. Our analysis sheds light on why Taiwan's new mechanism has led to massive nationwide demonstrations and why it nonetheless still remains in use… CONTINUE READING
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