Decoupling in electric utilities

  title={Decoupling in electric utilities},
  author={Timothy J. Brennan},
  journal={Journal of Regulatory Economics},
  • T. Brennan
  • Published 2010
  • Economics
  • Journal of Regulatory Economics
Distributing electricity to users has been covered through the charge per kilowatt-hour for electricity used. Conservation advocates have promoted policies that “decouple” distribution revenues or profits from the amount of electricity delivered, claiming that usage-based pricing leads utilities to encourage use and discourage conservation. Because decoupling separates profits from conduct, it runs against the dominant finding in regulatory economics in the last 20 years—that incentive-based… Expand
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