Decoding moral judgments from neural representations of intentions

  title={Decoding moral judgments from neural representations of intentions},
  author={Jorie Koster-Hale and Rebecca Saxe and James Dungan and Liane Young},
  journal={Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  pages={5648 - 5653}
Intentional harms are typically judged to be morally worse than accidental harms. Distinguishing between intentional harms and accidents depends on the capacity for mental state reasoning (i.e., reasoning about beliefs and intentions), which is supported by a group of brain regions including the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ). Prior research has found that interfering with activity in RTPJ can impair mental state reasoning for moral judgment and that high-functioning individuals with… 

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