Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection

@article{Jackson1991DecisionTheoreticCA,
  title={Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection},
  author={Frank Cameron Jackson},
  journal={Ethics},
  year={1991},
  volume={101},
  pages={461 - 482}
}
Our lives are given shape, meaning and value by what we hold dear, by those persons and life projects to which we are especially committed. This implies that when we act we must give a special place to those persons (typically our family and friends) and those projects. But, according to consequentialism classically conceived, the rightness and wrongness of an action is determined by the action's consequences considered impartially, without reference to the agent whose actions they are… Expand
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