Deceptive Labeling: Hypergames on Graphs for Stealthy Deception

  title={Deceptive Labeling: Hypergames on Graphs for Stealthy Deception},
  author={A. Kulkarni and Huan Luo and Nandi O. Leslie and Charles A. Kamhoua and Jie Fu},
  journal={IEEE Control Systems Letters},
With the increasing sophistication of attacks on cyber-physical systems, deception has emerged as an effective tool to improve system security and safety by obfuscating the attacker’s perception. In this letter, we present a solution to the deceptive game in which a control agent is to satisfy a Boolean objective specified by a co-safe temporal logic formula in the presence of an adversary. The agent intentionally introduces asymmetric information to create payoff misperception, which manifests… Expand
Decision and Game Theory for Security: 11th International Conference, GameSec 2020, College Park, MD, USA, October 28–30, 2020, Proceedings
A distributed anomaly detection scheme based on adversarially-trained data models that makes better use of decentralized resources, and decreases reliance on a single point of failure. Expand
Decoy Allocation Games on Graphs with Temporal Logic Objectives
This work focuses on the problem of jointly synthesizing a decoy placement strategy and a deceptive defense strategy that maximally exploits the incomplete information the attacker about the decoy locations, and introduces a model of hypergames on graphs with temporal logic objectives to capture such adversarial interactions with asymmetric information. Expand
Synthesis of Deceptive Cyberdefense with Temporal Logic Constraints
The design of provably correct systems from temporal logic specifications employs reactive synthesis, which models the interaction between the system and its dynamic environment as a two-playerExpand
Deceptive Decision-Making Under Uncertainty
A novel approach to model observer predictions based on the principle of maximum entropy and to efficiently generate deceptive strategies via linear programming is proposed to enable the agent to exhibit a variety of tunable deceptive behaviors while ensuring the satisfaction of probabilistic constraints on the behavior. Expand
Game-Theoretic and Machine Learning-based Approaches for Defensive Deception: A Survey
This survey paper focuses on defensive deception research centered on game theory and machine learning, since these are prominent families of artificial intelligence approaches that are widely employed in defensive deception. Expand
Game Theory on Attack Graph for Cyber Deception
Several games such as normal form static, dynamic, hypergame, and a partially observable stochastic game (POSG) are presented to study the game dynamics at different information structures to overcome the intractability of the game model. Expand
Synthesis of Deceptive Strategies in Reachability Games with Action Misperception
A dynamic hypergame model is introduced to capture the reachability game with evolving misperception of P2 and it is shown that DASW strategy is at least as powerful as Almost-Sure Winning (ASW) strategy in the game in which P1 does not account for P2's misperceptions. Expand


Permissive strategies: from parity games to safety games
An algorithm for finding a permissive strategy that encompasses all the behaviours of all memoryless strategies and its complexity matches currently known upper bounds for the simpler problem of finding the set of winning positions in a parity game. Expand
Hypergame Theory and Methodology: the Current “State of the Art”
The overall theme of this conference is the management of uncertainty: in the context of decision-making, “uncertainty” may take severall forms. I may be uncertain about my own preferences even forExpand
Hypergames and Cyber-Physical Security for Control Systems
This article uses hypergames to analyze how strategic perturbations of sensor readings and calibrated parameters can be used to manipulate a system that employs optimal control and finds that manipulating constraints can be a more effective attacker strategy than manipulating objective function parameters. Expand
Cyber Camouflage Games for Strategic Deception
This work presents Cyber Camouflage Games (CCG), a general-sum game model that captures attackers which can be diversely equipped and motivated, and shows that computing the optimal defender strategy is NP-hard even in the special case of unconstrained CCGs, and presents an efficient approximate solution for it. Expand
Discrete Event Systems: Modeling, Observation, and Control
  • S. Lafortune
  • Computer Science
  • Annual Review of Control, Robotics, and Autonomous Systems
  • 2019
This article begins with an introduction to the modeling of discrete event systems, a class of dynamical systems with discrete states and event-driven dynamics. It then focuses on logical discreteExpand
and C
  • Wang, “Dynamic Bayesian games for adversarial and defensive cyber deception,” in Autonomous Cyber Deception. Cham, Switzerland: Springer
  • 2019
and F
  • Fang, “Cyber camouflage games for strategic deception,” in Proc. Int. Conf. Decis. Game Theory Security
  • 2019
“A and B”:
Direct fabrication of large micropatterned single crystals. p1205 21 Feb 2003. (news): Academy plucks best biophysicists from a sea of mediocrity. p994 14 Feb 2003.
Dynamic Bayesian Games for Adversarial and Defensive Cyber Deception
It is essential to design up-to-date security mechanisms that can mitigate the risks despite the successful infiltration and the strategic response of sophisticated attackers. Expand