Decentralized Common Knowledge Oracles

@article{Williams2019DecentralizedCK,
  title={Decentralized Common Knowledge Oracles},
  author={Austin K. Williams and J. Peterson},
  journal={Ledger},
  year={2019},
  volume={4}
}
We define and analyze three mechanisms for getting common knowledge, a posteriori truths about the world, onto a blockchain in a decentralized setting. We show that, when a reasonable economic condition is met, these mechanisms are individually rational, incentive compatible, and decide the true outcome of valid oracle queries in both the non-cooperative and cooperative settings. These mechanisms are based upon repeated games with two classes of players: queriers who desire to get common… Expand
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