Debreu ’ s social equilibrium theorem with asymmetric information and a continuum of agents

@inproceedings{Yannelis2008DebreuS,
title={Debreu ’ s social equilibrium theorem with asymmetric information and a continuum of agents},
author={Nicholas C. Yannelis},
year={2008}
}

We provide several different generalizations of Debreu’s social equilibrium theorem by allowing for asymmetric information and a continuum of agents. The results not only extend the ones in Kim and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 77:330–353, 1977), Yannelis and Rustichini (Stud Econ Theory 2:23–48, 1991), but also new theorems are obtained which allow for a convexifying effect on aggregation (non-concavity assumption on the utility functions) and non-convex strategy sets (pure strategies). This is… CONTINUE READING