Data-Driven Models of Selfish Routing: Why Price of Anarchy Does Depend on Network Topology

  title={Data-Driven Models of Selfish Routing: Why Price of Anarchy Does Depend on Network Topology},
  author={Francisco Benita and Vittorio Bil{\`o} and Barnab{\'e} Monnot and Georgios Piliouras and Cosimo Vinci},
We investigate traffic routing both from the perspective of real world data as well as theory. First, we reveal through data analytics a natural but previously uncaptured regularity of real world routing behavior. Agents only consider, in their strategy sets, paths whose free-flow costs (informally their lengths) are within a small multiplicative $(1+\theta)$ constant of the optimal free-flow cost path connecting their source and destination where $\theta\geq0$. In the case of Singapore… 

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