Darwinian Metaphysics: Species And The Question Of Essentialism

@article{Okasha2004DarwinianMS,
  title={Darwinian Metaphysics: Species And The Question Of Essentialism},
  author={Samir Okasha},
  journal={Synthese},
  year={2004},
  volume={131},
  pages={191-213}
}
  • S. Okasha
  • Published 1 May 2002
  • Philosophy
  • Synthese
Biologists and philosophers of biology typically regard essentialism about speciesas incompatible with modern Darwinian theory. Analytic metaphysicians such asKripke, Putnam and Wiggins, on the other hand, believe that their essentialist thesesare applicable to biological kinds. I explore this tension. I show that standard anti-essentialist considerations only show that species do not have intrinsic essential properties. I argue that while Putnam and Kripke do make assumptions that contradict… 

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