DR.SGX: Hardening SGX Enclaves against Cache Attacks with Data Location Randomization

  title={DR.SGX: Hardening SGX Enclaves against Cache Attacks with Data Location Randomization},
  author={F. Brasser and Srdjan Capkun and A. Dmitrienko and Tommaso Frassetto and Kari Kostiainen and U. M{\"u}ller and A. Sadeghi},
  • F. Brasser, Srdjan Capkun, +4 authors A. Sadeghi
  • Published 2017
  • Computer Science
  • ArXiv
  • Recent research has demonstrated that Intel's SGX is vulnerable to various software-based side-channel attacks. [...] Key Method We design and implement a compiler-based tool called DR.SGX that instruments enclave code such that data locations are permuted at the granularity of cache lines. We realize the permutation with the CPU's cryptographic hardware-acceleration units providing secure randomization.Expand Abstract
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