DESIGN OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE : Role of Ownership Structure , Takeovers , Bank Debt and Large Shareholder Monitoring 1 Kose

@inproceedings{John1999DESIGNOC,
  title={DESIGN OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE : Role of Ownership Structure , Takeovers , Bank Debt and Large Shareholder Monitoring 1 Kose},
  author={G H John and Simi Kedia Stern},
  year={1999}
}
We examine the design of an optimal corporate governance system structured from four of the main mechanisms of corporate governance (managerial ownership, monitoring by a large outside shareholder, monitoring by banks and disciplining by the takeover market). Our design incorporates interactions among the mechanisms as well as the decentralized nature of decisions regarding their optimal use made by different agents (the entrepreneur, the manager and the large shareholder). The optimal blend of… CONTINUE READING

From This Paper

Figures, tables, and topics from this paper.

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 48 references

Relationship Investing: Large Shareholder Monitoring with Managerial Cooperation,

  • N. K. Chidambaran, K. John
  • Working Paper,
  • 1998
Highly Influential
5 Excerpts

Legal Determinants of External Finance

  • R. La Porta, F. Lopez-De-Silanes, A. Shleifer, R.W
  • Vishny,
  • 1997
Highly Influential
8 Excerpts

A Comparitive Analysis of Takeover Regulation in the European Community,

  • D. J. Berger
  • Law and Contemporary Problems,
  • 1992
Highly Influential
10 Excerpts

A Theory of the Choice Between Concentrated and Dispersed Ownership of Corporate Shares,

  • L. Bebchuk
  • 1998
1 Excerpt

A theory of pyramidal ownership,

  • D. Wolfenson
  • 1998

Block, Liquidity, and Corporate Control,

  • P. Bolton, E. von Thadden
  • Journal of Finance,
  • 1998

Executive Compensation,

  • K. J. Murphy
  • Handbook of Labor Economics,
  • 1998
2 Excerpts

Law and Finance

  • R. La Porta, F. Lopez-De-Silanes, A. Shleifer, R.W
  • Vishny,
  • 1998
1 Excerpt

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…