• Corpus ID: 140957659


  author={Isaac Levi},
Wlodek Rabinowicz (2002) has challenged the thesis that deliberation as to what one is to do and prediction as to what one will do cannot be jointly undertaken coherently. He maintains that even if it were true, it would not have the kind of relevance for theories of rational choice and game theory that some of its proponents claim it has. He also claims that the proponents have not made a compelling case for the thesis. I disagree. I will devote my tribute to Wlodek on his 60 birthday to an… 
Deliberation and Prediction
Can an agent hold a meaningful credence about an upcoming action, while she deliberates about what to do. Can she believe that it is, say, 70% probable that she will do A, while she chooses whether
ABSTRACT According to the so-called ‘deliberation crowds out prediction’ thesis, while deliberating about what you'll do, you cannot rationally have credences for what you'll do – you cannot
Ramsey and Joyce on deliberation and prediction
This work explains why DCOP holds in a Ramseyian operationalist model of credence, but shows that it is trivial to extend this model so that DCOP fails, and discusses a model due to Joyce, and shows that Joyce’s rejection of DCOP rests on terminological choices about terms such as ‘intention’, ‘prediction’ and ‘belief’.
Rationality, preference satisfaction and anomalous intentions: why rational choice theory is not self-defeating
The critics of rational choice theory (henceforth, RCT) frequently claim that RCT is self-defeating in the sense that agents who abide by RCT’s prescriptions are less successful in satisfying their
Solving a Paradox of Evidential Equivalence
David Builes presents a paradox concerning how confident you should be that any given member of an infinite collection of fair coins landed heads, conditional on the information that they were all


It is a popular view that practical deliberation excludes foreknowledge of one's choice. Wolfgang Spohn and Isaac Levi have argued that not even a purely prob- abilistic self-prediction is available
Self-knowledge, Uncertainty, and Choice
  • F. Schick
  • Economics
    The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 1979
This paper takes up some problems in the theory of choice, problems arising from questions of where and when we can choose at all, or see any point in choosing. Some of these problems have a long
Where Luce and Krantz do really generalize Savage's decision model
In this paper I shall somewhat investigate several formulations of decision theory from a purely quantitative point of view, thus leaving aside the whole question of measurement. Since almost any
Nonmonotonic Inference Based on Expectations
Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice
Consider any economic agent who is choosing a plan which is going to take some time to implement. Examples are a firm undertaking a long-term investment project, a consumer contemplating the choice
Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality Author ( s )
If it is common knowledge that the players in a game are Bayesian utility maximizers who treat uncertainty about other players' actions like any other uncertainty, then the outcome is necessarily a
A general non-probabilistic theory of inductive reasoning
Consequentialist foundations for expected utility
Behaviour norms are considered for decision trees which allow both objective probabilities and uncertain states of the world with unknown probabilities. Terminal nodes have consequences in a given
Dynamic Restrictions on Metastatic Choice
shall call the "metastatic" model, and the second the "dynamic" model. The "metastatic" model has an agent making a single once-and-for-all lifetime plan, which never needs to be revised. It is the
Expectations in Economics
The major theme of this book is the theory of rational expectations and its role in modern macroeconomics. In this chapter, we depart somewhat from that theme and introduce rational expectations in a