Déjà Vu All Over Again: Agency, Uncertainty, Leverage and the Panic of 1857

  title={D{\'e}j{\`a} Vu All Over Again: Agency, Uncertainty, Leverage and the Panic of 1857},
  author={Timothy J. Riddiough and Howard E. Thompson},
  journal={Economic History eJournal},
The panic of 1857 is revisited with the benefit of hindsight provided by the panic of 2007-08, where a number of parallels are identified between the two panics. We present new evidence on causes of the failure of the financial institution that triggered the panic of 1857 and conduct a detailed analysis of railroad financial and accounting practices. New financial innovations are also studied-the railroad farm mortgage and farm mortgage-backed security-which had similarities to the modern sub… 

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    The Journal of Economic History
  • 2021
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