• Corpus ID: 220400462

Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation

  title={Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation},
  author={Erica D. Borghard},
There are important empirical reasons to suspect that the risks of cyber escalation may be exaggerated. If cyberspace is in fact an environment that generates severe escalation risks, why has cyber escalation not yet occurred? We posit that cyber escalation has not occurred because cyber operations are poor tools of escalation. In particular, we argue that this stems from key characteristics of offensive cyber capabilities that limit escalation through four mechanisms. First, retaliatory… 

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