Current Physics and ‘the Physical’

  title={Current Physics and ‘the Physical’},
  author={Agust{\'i}n Vicente},
  journal={The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
  pages={393 - 416}
  • Agustín Vicente
  • Published 1 June 2011
  • Philosophy, Physics, Education
  • The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Physicalism is the claim that that there is nothing in the world but the physical. Philosophers who defend physicalism have to confront a well-known dilemma, known as Hempel’s dilemma, concerning the definition of ‘the physical’: if ‘the physical’ is whatever current physics says there is, then physicalism is most probably false; but if ‘the physical’ is whatever the true theory of physics would say that there is, we have that physicalism is vacuous and runs the risk of becoming trivial. This… 
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