Currency Regimes, Capital Flows, and Crises

@article{Krugman2014CurrencyRC,
  title={Currency Regimes, Capital Flows, and Crises},
  author={Paul Krugman},
  journal={IMF Economic Review},
  year={2014},
  volume={62},
  pages={470-493}
}
  • P. Krugman
  • Published 1 November 2014
  • Economics
  • IMF Economic Review
Ever since Greece experienced its debt crisis, fiscal discussion has been “Hellenized” — that is, there are constant warnings that other countries, including the United States, are on the verge of a similar crisis. But can countries that borrow in their own currency experience Greek-type crises? I argue, based both on evidence and on simple modeling, that the answer is no. 
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