Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis

  title={Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis},
  author={Hessel Oosterbeek and Randolph Sloof and Gijs van de Kuilen},
  journal={Experimental Economics},
This paper reports the findings of a meta-analysis of 37 papers with 75 results from ultimatum game experiments. We find that on average the proposer offers 40% of the pie to the responder. This share is smaller for larger pie sizes and larger when a strategy method is used or when subjects are inexperienced. On average 16% of the offers is rejected. The rejection rate is lower for larger pie sizes and for larger shares offered. Responders are less willing to accept an offer when the strategy… 
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