Cues to Coup Plotters

  title={Cues to Coup Plotters},
  author={Tore Wig and Espen R{\o}d},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  pages={787 - 812}
  • Tore WigEspen Rød
  • Published 1 August 2016
  • Political Science
  • Journal of Conflict Resolution
A large proportion of coup attempts in autocracies occur in the aftermath of elections, yet little systematic research exists on the topic. Drawing on recent literature on elections in autocracies, we present an argument to explain postelection coups. While we recognize that electoral institutions have the potential to stabilize autocracies, we illustrate that the election event can spark instability when incumbents reveal electoral weakness. Electoral outcomes—in the form of vote shares and… 

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