Cryptoviral extortion using Microsoft's Crypto API

  title={Cryptoviral extortion using Microsoft's Crypto API},
  author={A. Young},
  journal={International Journal of Information Security},
  • A. Young
  • Published 2006
  • Computer Science
  • International Journal of Information Security
  • This paper presents the experimental results that were obtained by implementing the payload of a cryptovirus on the Microsoft Windows platform. The attack is based entirely on the Microsoft Cryptographic API and the needed API calls are covered in detail. More specifically, it is shown that by using eight types of API calls and 72 lines of C code, the payload can hybrid encrypt sensitive data and hold it hostage. Benchmarks are also given. A novel countermeasure against cryptoviral extortion… CONTINUE READING
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