Cryptography from Anonymity

Abstract

There is a vast body of work on implementing anonymous communication. In this paper, we study the possibility of using anonymous communication as a building block, and show that one can leverage on anonymity in a variety of cryptographic contexts. Our results go in two directions. middot Feasibility. We show that anonymous communication over insecure channels can be used to implement unconditionally secure point-to-point channels, broadcast, and general multi-party protocols that remain unconditionally secure as long as less than half of the players are maliciously corrupted. middot Efficiency. We show that anonymous channels can yield substantial efficiency improvements for several natural secure computation tasks. In particular, we present the first solution to the problem of private information retrieval (PIR) which can handle multiple users while being close to optimal with respect to both communication and computation

DOI: 10.1109/FOCS.2006.25

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@article{Ishai2006CryptographyFA, title={Cryptography from Anonymity}, author={Yuval Ishai and Eyal Kushilevitz and Rafail Ostrovsky and Amit Sahai}, journal={2006 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'06)}, year={2006}, pages={239-248} }