Corpus ID: 5656901

Crony Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics

@inproceedings{Song2014CronyCW,
  title={Crony Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics},
  author={Michael Song},
  year={2014}
}
We propose three key features of Chinese capitalism over the last two decades. First, power is held by about 3000 local governments (instead of the central government). Second, local governments have substantial capacity to provide public goods and face little accountability. Third, local governments have implicit arrangements with successful private firms that provide private firms with incentives to grow. These characteristics of local governments explain the presence of local "crony… Expand

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