Critical Strategies Under Approval Voting : Who Gets Ruled In And Ruled Out

@inproceedings{Brams2005CriticalSU,
  title={Critical Strategies Under Approval Voting : Who Gets Ruled In And Ruled Out},
  author={Steven J. Brams},
  year={2005}
}
We introduce the notion of a “critical strategy profile” under approval voting (AV), which facilitates the identification of all possible outcomes that can occur under AV. Included among AV outcomes are those given by scoring rules, single transferable vote, the majoritarian compromise, Condorcet systems, and others as well. Under each of these systems, a Condorcet winner may be upset through manipulation by individual voters or coalitions of voters, whereas AV ensures the election of a… CONTINUE READING
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