Critical Issues in the Practice of Market Design

@article{Milgrom2011CriticalII,
  title={Critical Issues in the Practice of Market Design},
  author={Paul R. Milgrom},
  journal={New Institutional Economics eJournal},
  year={2011}
}
  • P. Milgrom
  • Published 17 March 2011
  • Economics
  • New Institutional Economics eJournal
The years since 1994 have witnessed the emergence of market design as a new discipline within economics, in which research and practice exert powerful mutual influences in matching and auction markets. The problem of designing well-functioning auction markets has led economic designers to revisit such fundamental issues as the definitions of commodities, the ways participants communicate with markets, the trade-offs between the incentives provided for truthful reporting and other attributes of… 

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