Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail

@article{Sechser2013CrisisBA,
  title={Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail},
  author={Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann},
  journal={International Organization},
  year={2013},
  volume={67},
  pages={173 - 195}
}
Abstract Do nuclear weapons offer coercive advantages in international crisis bargaining? Almost seventy years into the nuclear age, we still lack a complete answer to this question. While scholars have devoted significant attention to questions about nuclear deterrence, we know comparatively little about whether nuclear weapons can help compel states to change their behavior. This study argues that, despite their extraordinary power, nuclear weapons are uniquely poor instruments of compellence… 
Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance in the Baltic Region
Questions about the nuclear balance have resurfaced in Europe after a long hiatus. NATO members in the Baltic region especially worry that Russia might use nuclear weapons to gain a strategic
Deterring Intervention: The Civil Origins of Nuclear Proliferation
Standard nuclear deterrence theory suggests that atomic weapons decrease the probability of conflict between states. We argue that nuclear weapons can have such a chilling effect on civil wars as
A Double-Edged Sword: Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Caution
Most empirical studies of the effects of nuclear weapons only consider whether a state at a given time has nuclear arms or not, but there are strong reasons to think that the effects of a state’s
Nuclear Learning: Nuclear Coercion and the Proliferation Dilemma - eScholarship
Since 1945 the United States has not used nuclear weapons to attack other states, yet it has used nuclear coercion more actively than any state. Why did the U.S. use nuclear coercion at all against
What Does It Take to Deter? Regional Power Nuclear Postures and International Conflict
Existing nuclear deterrence scholarship evinces a pervasive “existential bias,” assuming that once a state merely possesses nuclear weapons, it should be able to deter armed conflict. The empirical
International Security: Nuclear Proliferation
Since the advent of the nuclear age, scholars have sought to provide rationales behind decisions to pursue, forgo, or relinquish nuclear weapons programs. Security, status, cost, technical
Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy
Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's
Do nuclear weapons affect the guns-butter trade-off? Evidence on nuclear substitution from Pakistan and beyond
Scholars have argued that acquiring nuclear weapons should allow states the luxury of exiting conventional arms races. In turn, a decreased budgetary focus on conventional arms should make possible
Questioning the Effect of Nuclear Weapons on Conflict
We examine the effect of nuclear weapons on interstate conflict. Using more appropriate methodologies than have previously been used, we find that dyads in which both states possess nuclear weapons
The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended Deterrence: Moral Hazard in a Nuclear Client State
Do “nuclear umbrellas” create a moral hazard that can increase the risk of war? In this article, we investigate whether situations of extended deterrence in which a nuclear patron makes a defensive
...
...

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 71 REFERENCES
Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance
In numerous crises after World War II--Berlin, Korea, the Taiwan Straits, and the Middle East--the United States resorted to vague threats to use nuclear weapons in order to deter Soviet or Chinese
What Does It Take to Deter? Regional Power Nuclear Postures and International Conflict
Existing nuclear deterrence scholarship evinces a pervasive “existential bias,” assuming that once a state merely possesses nuclear weapons, it should be able to deter armed conflict. The empirical
Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power
Abstract States typically issue compellent threats against considerably weaker adversaries, yet their threats often fail. Why? Expanding on a standard model of international crisis bargaining, I
Nuclear Fallacy: Dispelling the Myth of Nuclear Strategy
I T h e most recent stage in the great nuclear debate, which has now kept the strategic studies community busy and perplexed for a full decade, reflects disillusion with the more ambitious strategic
Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence
How can states signal their alliance commitments? Although scholars have developed sophisticated theoretical models of costly signaling in international relations, we know little about which specific
The coming crisis : nuclear proliferation, U.S. interests, and world order
How will continued proliferation of nuclear weapons change the global political order? This collection of essays comes to conclusions at odds with the conventional wisdom. Stephen Rosen and Barry
Winning with the Bomb
Nuclear weapons' effects on an actor's success in coercive diplomacy are in part a function of how nuclear weapons change the perceived costs of conflict. The authors argue that states can improve
Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace: A Quantitative Empirical Analysis, 1941-2000
When do states attack or consider attacking nuclear infrastructure in nonnuclear weapons states? Despite the importance of this question, relatively little scholarly research has considered when and
Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes
Abstract Scholars have long debated whether nuclear superiority or the balance of resolve shapes the probability of victory in nuclear crises, but they have not clearly articulated a mechanism
Selection Effects and Deterrence
The empirical question of how often deterrent threats issued during international disputes succeed has been hotly debated for years, with some researchers arguing that virtually no robust cases of
...
...