Creation, Actualization and God's Choice among Possible Worlds

  title={Creation, Actualization and God's Choice among Possible Worlds},
  author={Klaas J. Kraay},
  journal={Philosophy Compass},
  • K. Kraay
  • Published 1 July 2008
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophy Compass
God is traditionally understood to be a perfect being who is the creator and sustainer of all that is. God's creative and sustaining activity is often thought to involve choosing a possible world for actualization. It is generally said that either there is (a) exactly one best of all possible worlds, or there are (b) infinitely many increasingly better worlds, or else there are (c) infinitely many unsurpassable worlds within God's power to actualize. On each view, critics have offered arguments… 

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