Covert Messaging through TCP Timestamps

@inproceedings{Giffin2002CovertMT,
  title={Covert Messaging through TCP Timestamps},
  author={John Giffin and Rachel Greenstadt and Peter Litwack and Richard Tibbetts},
  booktitle={Privacy Enhancing Technologies},
  year={2002}
}
Covert channels exist in most communications systems and allow individuals to communicate truly undectably. However, covert channels are seldom used due to their complexity. A protocol for sending data over a common class of low-bandwidth covert channels has been developed. The protocol is secure against attack by powerful adversaries. The design of a practical system implementing the protocol on a standard platform (Linux) exploiting a channel in a common communications system (TCP timestamps… 

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