Covert Channels in LAN's

@article{Girling1987CovertCI,
  title={Covert Channels in LAN's},
  author={C. Gray Girling},
  journal={IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering},
  year={1987},
  volume={SE-13},
  pages={292-296}
}
  • C. Girling
  • Published 1 February 1987
  • Computer Science
  • IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
An information transfer path that allows information to be transferred in a manner that violates the security policy of a trusted network is called a covert channel. 
View on IEEE
doi.org
212 Citations
Highly Influential Citations
16
Background Citations
100
Methods Citations
35
Results Citations
3

Figures from this paper

212 Citations

Covert Channels in LAN Protocols

There is a potential of unused bandwidth in commonly used LAN protocols, which might be exploitable as covert channel and the key point is, that exploitation of this potential is not a question of a LAN's architecture, but is strongly dependent on the design of its internal interfaces and on its implementations.

HIDE_DHCP: Covert Communications through Network Configuration Messages

This work analyzes a protocol extensively used today, the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), in search of new forms of covert communication, and observes several features that can be effectively exploited for subliminal data transmission.

A Novel Covert Channel Based on Length of Messages

A novel protocol-independent covert channel that could deliver normal network traffic is designed and simulated on HTTP protocol and its security and bandwidth are analyzed.

Covert communications through network configuration messages

A CHANNEL ANALYSIS IN NETWORK SECURITY - USING A COVERT APPROACH

The objective of this work is to implement a model for network security, using covert channels as a secure environment and covert protocol as a new standard for communication between multi parties but without disclosing the client’s details.

A survey of covert channels and countermeasures in computer network protocols

A survey of the existing techniques for creating covert channels in widely deployed network and application protocols and an overview of common methods for their detection, elimination, and capacity limitation, required to improve security in future computer networks are given.

Covert Channel Research

This paper firstly analysis the covert channel concept, field, techniques and classification, and surveys the classic techniques and methods from the following aspects: covert channel identification, measurement, elimination, limitation, auditing, and detection.

Research on Construction Methods for Network Covert Channels Based on HTTP

The working principle of network covert channels is analyzed, the commonly used construction technology is summarized, and the characteristics of the HTTP header lines are analyzed.

Covert Channel over Network Time Protocol

A way through which covert messages are sent and received using the Network Time Protocol (NTP), which is not easily detected since NTP should be present in most environment to synchronize the clock between clients and servers using at least one time server is scrutinized.

Ephemeral Feature Presentation of Covert Channels in Network Protocols

This paper presents overview of different protocol as well as some packet length based covert channels, having tamper resistance capability but due to abnormal traffic distribution results in recognition possibility.
...

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 15 REFERENCES

Cryptographic Protocol for Trustable Match Making

The protocol uses an authentication scheme that provides the desired degree of anonymity and authentication and is used to detect active attackers, and to camouflage information that cannot be hidden cryptographically.

How to exchange (secret) keys

A protocol is presented whereby two adversaries may exchange secrets, although neither trusts the other, and it is shown how each of the two can prove, for each bit delivered, that the bit is good.

Safeguarding cryptographic keys

  • G. Blakley
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
    1979 International Workshop on Managing Requirements Knowledge (MARK)
  • 1979
Certain cryptographic keys, such as a number which makes it possible to compute the secret decoding exponent in an RSA public key cryptosystem, 1 , 5 or the system master key and certain other keys…

A randomized protocol for signing contracts

Randomized protocols for signing contracts, certified mail, and flipping a coin are presented and an implementation of the 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, using any public key cryptosystem, is presented.

New Directions in Cryptography

This paper suggests ways to solve currently open problems in cryptography, and discusses how the theories of communication and computation are beginning to provide the tools to solve cryptographic problems of long standing.

Cryptography and Data Security

The goal of this book is to introduce the mathematical principles of data security and to show how these principles apply to operating systems, database systems, and computer networks.

How to share a secret

  • A. Shamir
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
    CACM
  • 1979
This technique enables the construction of robust key management schemes for cryptographic systems that can function securely and reliably even when misfortunes destroy half the pieces and security breaches expose all but one of the remaining pieces.

An Improved Algorithm for Computing Logarithms over GF(p) and Its Cryptographic Significance

An improved algorithm is derived which requires O(log2 p) complexity if p 1 has only small prime factors and such values of p must be avoided in the cryptosystem.

RSA/Rabin Least Significant Bits are 1/2 + 1/(poly(log N)) Secure

It is proved that RSA least significant bit is 1/2 + 1/logc N secure, for any constant c (where N is the RSA modulus), which implies that Rabin/RSA encryption can be directly used for pseudo random bits generation, provided that factoring/inverting RSA is hard.

Discrete Logarithms in Finite Fields and Their Cryptographic Significance

  • A. Odlyzko
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
    EUROCRYPT
  • 1984
This paper surveys and analyzes known algorithms in this area, with special attention devoted to algorithms for the fields GF(2n), finding that in order to be safe from attacks using these algorithms, the value of n for which GF( 2n) is used in a cryptosystem has to be very large and carefully chosen.