• Corpus ID: 17225886

Coup traps: why does Africa have so many coups d'état?

  title={Coup traps: why does Africa have so many coups d'{\'e}tat?},
  author={Paul. Collier and Anke Hoeffler},
In Africa coup plots are by far the most common challenge to the continuity of regimes. In this paper we investigate proneness to coups by drawing on our previous work on proneness to civil war. The most striking aspect of our results is the similarity in the causes of coups and civil wars. Standard indicators of grievance such as political repression and economic inequality do not feature as significant influences. A common core of economic factors underpins proneness to coups and civil wars… 
Coup d’état or Coup d'Autocracy? How Coups Impact Democratization, 1950–2008
This paper considers how coups impact democratization. Current research focuses on coups as a threat to consolidated and fledgling democracies. Policymakers have adapted to this viewpoint by treating
Why class inequality breeds coups but not civil wars
  • C. Houle
  • Political Science, Economics
  • 2016
Does class inequality increase the risk of civil war? I posit that inequality between social classes affects civil wars through two pathways: (1) it heightens the risk of political violence by
Guarding the State or Protecting the Economy? the economic factors of Pakistan's military coups
Many scholars have debated the causes of the coup d ’etat since the mid-twentieth century. A recent bra nch of theories have linked the risk of military coups d’e tat with the state of the economy.
Loyalty for sale? Military spending and coups d’etat
  • G. Leon
  • Economics, Political Science
  • 2014
Coups d’etat continue to be common around the world, often leading to changes in leaders and institutions. We examine the relationship between military spending and coups and find that (i) successful
Regime Stability in Post-1986 Uganda
Uganda has remained stable since 1986 despite predisposition to previous coups, and provides evidence consistent with, and useful for testing the efficacy of, Quinlivan’s coup-proofing theory: with relevant application and domestication the theory applies to Uganda.
Breaking Out of the Coup Trap
This article systematically assesses whether open political competition ends the coup trap. We use an original data set of coup reports, electoral competition, and socioeconomic data spanning the
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  • Political Science
  • 2016
Under what conditions do political leaders take strategies that allow them to reduce militaries’ capabilities to successfully organize a coup? There is a broad consensus among previous studies that
Erosion of Civilian Control in Democracies: A Comprehensive Framework for Comparative Analysis
Civilian control of the military is a fundamental attribute of democracy. While democracies are less coup-prone, studies treating civilian control as a dependent variable mostly focus on coups. In
When War Helps Civil–military Relations
Coups remain a widespread and consequential political phenomenon, but it remains unclear whether interstate conflict protects leaders from the risk of coups or increases this risk. We theorize that
Investing in Violence: Foreign Direct Investment and Coups in Authoritarian Regimes
Why do foreign investors invest in authoritarian regimes despite higher political risks? In this paper, I evaluate the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI), coups, and political risk.


African military coups d'état, 1956–2001: frequency, trends and distribution
  • P. McGowan
  • Political Science
    The Journal of Modern African Studies
  • 2003
Described here is a new data set including all successful coups d'état (80), failed coup attempts (108) and reported coup plots (139) for all 48 independent sub-Saharan African (SSA) states for the
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
An influential conventional wisdom holds that civil wars proliferated rapidly with the end of the Cold War and that the root cause of many or most of these has been ethnic and religious antagonisms.
A Probabilistic Approach to the Causes of Coups d'Etat
‘In the last ten years on my individual reckoning’, observes S. E. Finer, ‘there have been seventy-three coups in forty-six countries’. ‘Coups’, Gurr comments, ‘can alter political processes and
Unintended Consequences: Does Aid Promote Arms Races?
Using global data for the period 1960–99, we model military expenditure. Neighbours’ military spending and development aid are important determinants of military expenditure. An implication of the
Greed and Grievance in Civil War
We investigate the causes of civil war, using a new data set of wars during 1960-99. We test a `greed’ theory focusing on the ability to finance rebellion, against a`grievance’ theory focusing on
Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data
This article reports and analyzes an updated version of the widely-used Polity II dataset, consisting of annual indicators of institutional democracy and autocracy for 161 states spanning the years
Determinants of Economic Growth
Over the last two to three decades a wide range of studies has inves﬒ gated the determinants of economic growth. Using diff ering conceptual and methodological approaches, these studies have placed
Military expenditure in post-conflict societies
Abstract.Post-conflict situations face a high risk of reversion to conflict. We investigate the effect of military expenditure by the government during the first decade post-conflict on the risk of
Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook
List of Figures List of Tables Foreword By Walter Liqueur Preface to the First Edition Preface to the 1979 Edition 1. What is the Coup d'Etat? 2. When is a PossibleCoup d'Etat? 3. The Stratgey of