Coup d’État and Democracy

  title={Coup d’{\'E}tat and Democracy},
  author={Curtis Bell},
  journal={Comparative Political Studies},
  pages={1167 - 1200}
  • Curtis Bell
  • Published 2016
  • Economics
  • Comparative Political Studies
  • This article explains coup activity in democracies by adapting insights from the literature on commitment problems and framing coup around the threats leaders and potential coup plotters pose to each other. I claim democratic constraints on executive power inhibit a leader’s ability to repress threats from political rivals. Though this decreases motivations for coup attempts, it also makes democracies more vulnerable should a coup attempt occur. Consequently, democratic constraints on executive… CONTINUE READING
    21 Citations

    Figures and Tables from this paper

    No Easy Way Out: The Effect of Military Coups on State Repression
    • 1
    Democratic Breakdown and the Hidden Perils of the Democratic Peace
    Leader survival and purges after a failed coup d’état
    • 6
    Spatial Rivalry and Coups Against Dictators
    • 5
    • PDF


    Coup d’état or Coup d'Autocracy? How Coups Impact Democratization, 1950–2008
    • 59
    • PDF
    Coups and Democracy
    • 149
    • PDF
    Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing? On the Relationship between Regime Type and Civil—Military Relations
    • 75
    • PDF
    Elite Co-optation, Repression, and Coups in Autocracies
    • 29
    • PDF
    Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory
    • 257
    The Impact of Institutional Coup-Proofing on Coup Attempts and Coup Outcomes
    • 44
    Does Democratization Reduce the Risk of Military Interventions in Politics in Africa?
    • 52
    • PDF
    Explaining African Military Coups d'Etat, 1960-1982
    • 125
    • PDF
    Coups d'État in Africa: A Political Economy Approach
    • 49
    • PDF