Coup-Proofing and Military Inefficiencies: An Experiment

  title={Coup-Proofing and Military Inefficiencies: An Experiment},
  author={Andrew W. Bausch},
  journal={International Interactions},
  pages={1 - 32}
  • Andrew W. Bausch
  • Published 2018
  • Political Science
  • International Interactions
  • ABSTRACT Coup-proofing occurs when a leader arranges his military to prevent military leaders from overthrowing him. However, coup-proofing often has the additional effect of lowering the military’s effectiveness in conflict. This article discusses coup-proofing in the context of the Nouri al-Maliki’s regime in Iraq before presenting two formal models. The first model shows when coups are possible, leaders select military commanders with lower ability but higher loyalty. The second model shows… CONTINUE READING
    4 Citations


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